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In his extraordinary work, Animals I 
Rights, first p.ililished in 1892, Henry Salt, 
although giving much credit to humanitarian 
feeling in antiquity and the Renaissance, 
situated the first true develofXOOIlt of the 
concept of animal rights in the Enlighten­
ment. "It was not until the eighteenth cen­
tury, the age of enlightenment and 'sensibi­
lity' of which Voltaire and Rousseau were the 
spokesmen, " he wrote, "that the rights of 
animals obtained ITDre deliberate recognition" 
(p. 4). Indeed, in our contemporary under­
standing of the word, all of its variants and 
offshoots (the rights of man, of the citizen, 
of WOllen, slaves, prisoners, gays--and of 
animals, too) stem fran that period when the 
European bourgeoisie, and by extension the 
American as well, formulated a revolutionary 
ideology that, in the language of the time, 
called for liberation fran tyranny, des­
potism, and oppression and vindicated libera­
tive action by the elaboration of a network 
of "rights"--aITDng them life, liberty, and 
the prrsuit of happiness, as well as sane 
that we might consider ITDre esoteric, like 
the right to own property, but which Voltaire 
likened to the cry of nature. 
Neither Rousseau nor Voltaire can prob­
ably be considered a major contributor to the 
develofXOOIlt of the concept of animal rights, 
but Salt's words are no less true for that. 
More direct attacks on human mistreatment of 
animals in the name of their innate (if not 
Gcd-given) rights and on the ITDdel of the 
ongoing struggle for human rights (not just 
those of the male, white bourgeoisie but of 
WOllen, slaves, proletarians, and colonial 
peoples) found their source in the writings 
of the Enlightenment PrilosoIilers, aITDng 
them, Rousseau and Voltaire, who both ad­
dressed themselves to the question of the 
relation between rnen and beasts. 
tification or even of kinship. Sadly, per­
haps, we must admit the i.rmlense resistance 
human beings present to recognizing obliga­
tions even to individuals of their own race 
and species without a prior denonstration of 
sane sort of kinship. "Blood is thicker than 
water. " The author of the medieval Chanson 
de Roland expressed this parochial conviction 
with admirable succinctness; "Christians are 
right (unt droit); pagans are wrong." The 
old British device invokes "Dieu et ITDn 
droit" (Gcd and my right), not the rights of 
others. 
Rousseau and Voltaire inherited fran 
their recent past as a target for criticism 
an analysis of man's radical difference fran 
other living creatures that was riddled with 
contradictions but had acquired status be­
cause of the unquestionable brilliance of its 
author, the great Rene Descartes. in an 
effort doubtless directed both toward coun­
tering accusations of heresy and justifying 
the use of animals in experimentation ("ab­
solving men fran the suspicion of crime," in 
his words) , Descartes argued that animals 
were natural automata, incapable of thought 
and feeling and ITDved by divinely created 
mechanisms analogous to the ingenious spring­
operated clockwork devices that human beings 
had used to give a semblance of life to their 
own inanimate creations. (If one leaves Gcd 
out of the equation, Descartes' explanation 
of animal behavior is not very far fran the 
one that present-day behavioristic socio­
biologists offer for the conduct of human 
beings, whose every gesture is dictated by an 
inherited genetic code and who can find vir­
tue or vice in pills or liquid potions, much 
like their literary ITDdel, Stevenson's Dr. 
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Jekyll.) Why God endowed these insentient 
lOOchanical creatures with a canplete set of 
sensory organs remarkably similar to those of 
human beings, Descartes failed to explain, 
although he clearly was aware of this anbar­
rassing impediment to the plausibility of his 
arguwent and admitted that the presence of 
those organs might lead less subtle minds 
than his to the false conclusion that animals 
were capable of sensation. 
With this over-easy dismissal of a grave 
IOOral problem that had troubled others for 
centuries, Descartes affirms a sanewhat fa­
cile seal to the position that there is a 
radical and absolute difference, an un­
bridgeable gulf separating humanity fran all 
other creatures on earth (theologians were 
willing to speculate on our possible kinship 
with demons and angels, distant cousins in 
heaven or hell, related to us by their intel­
lect) • One of the problems Descartes' posi­
tion created for him was that it was irrecon­
cilable with a belief in evolution, and there 
seem to be sane hints that he thought the 
evolutionary process not inconceivable. A 
century later, the naturalist Buffon would 
adopt a similarly contradictory stance, ad­
hering to orthodox Christian belief in the 
idea of separate creation for humankind, but 
also clearly aware of the many functional and 
structural resemblances between us and other 
animals. Obviously, acceptance of the impli­
cations of zoological observation required 
either exceptional courage or the advent of 
an era in which Christian dogma would be put 
on the defensiv8. Needless to say, Voltaire 
and Rousseau not only lived in such an era, 
as Buffon did, too, but possessed extraordi­
nary courage. Discreet as Voltaire could be 
and timid as Rousseau surely was in many 
situations, they jeopardized their freedan 
and even their lives with much of what they 
wrote. 
It would be extravagant, however, to see 
either of these two as putting his neck on 
the block for animals' rights, or even as 
considering this a central issue. Neither 
one--and this is not to their discredit-­
went so far in his repudiation of the Car­
tesian characterization of aniJreJ.s as Darwin 
would in the next century, IOOSt explicitly in 
The Descent of Man. Darwin's writing--and 
this was for many of his contemp::>raries, as 
it still is today for "Creationists," the 
IOOst horrifying aspect of it---tended toward a 
recognition of a literal blood relationship 
or consanguinity, our true family relation­
ship with those species that even he con­
tinued to call the "lower orders." Born with 
what Darwin called "a pedigree of prodigious 
length," man owes that birth to a long line 
of non-human progenitors. "Unless we will­
fully close our eyes," Darwin concluded in 
his chapter on the genealogy of man, "we may, 
with our present knowledge, approximately 
recognize our parentage." "Nor," he added, 
"need we feel ashamed of it" (The Descent of 
Man, chapter VI). Darwin was not the first 
to reject the belief that man is the work of 
a separate act of creation, although his wri­
tings went farther to establish the certainty 
of our tilysical relatedness to other animals 
than any had before. But if we distinguish 
the "scientific" deIOOnstration of a literal 
family-tree sort of kinship fran the senti­
ment of sharing in a cemoon nature, involving 
both tilysical and spiritual relatedness, then 
Voltaire and Rousseau are readily identifi­
able aIOOng Darwin's predecesors--more than 
Descartes and Buffon, who, ironically, are 
sozretimes perceived as in the lineage of the 
evolutionist tililosotilers. 
*** 
'The best text to cite fran Voltaire is 
surely the short piece entitled "Betes" 
(beasts) in the original 1764 edition of the 
Dictionnaire prilosophique, included by Tern 
Regan and Peter Singer in Animal Rights and 
Human Obligations (pp. 67-69), under the 
title of 'A Reply to Descartes." It is un­
mistakably a refutation of Descartes' posi­
tion, although he is not named in the ar­
ticle. Voltaire does not mince words, haw­
ever. He denounces the poverty of spirit of 
those who claim that animals are machines 
deprived of awareness and feeling (connias­
~ et sentiment). Descartes had argued 
that articulate speech constitutes the only 
evidence of capacity for feeling or for memo­
ry or ideas. Voltaire, in seeking to demon­
strate the vacuity of this arguwent (really 
no IOOre than an assertion) describes in de­
tail the compelling evidence of a dog's 
feelings of grief, pain, and joy in the form 
of what present-day linguists might call 
"non-~tic" behavior. In refreshingly unin­
hibited language, he does not hesitate to 
describe as "barbarisms" the vivisectionists 
as he pictures them seiZing the dog "who 
surpasses man so prodigiously in friendship," 
nailing him to a table, and cutting him up 
alive. "Answer loo, lOOchanic (machiniste), 
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has nature arranged all the springs of feel­
ing in this animal so that it should not 
feel?" (It is significant and, of course, 
characteristic that, while Descartes des­
cribed the body as a machine made by the 
hands of God, Voltaire identifies the archi­
teet of creation as Nature herself, thus 
distancing himself from orthodox Christian 
theism. ) 
Voltaire' s language is direct, clear , 
unambiguous, and forceful. He appeals to the 
reader's cx:xrrron sense and to his personal 
observations and experience of life. He 
addressed the unnamed Descartes and those who 
think as he does directly with the familiar 
tu, abolishing distance and formality and 
creating, as it were, the illusion of dia­
logue and, with it, life and IlIOvement. Last­
ly, he does not dissociate theory and prac­
tice, as a IlIOre timid writer might. The 
cartesian to whom he appeals is not an idle 
armchair theorist, whose intellectual con­
structions are divorced from concrete reali­
ty, from the active, lived experience. No! 
He himself is p..1tting the ideas into prac­
tice, which, indeed, is inseparable from the 
theory that has been concocted to legitimize 
it. This practice is being irnp::Jsed, brutally 
and inhumanely, upon the animal Voltaire 
represents as being like ourselves. In him, 
he declares, "there are the same organs of 
feeling as there are in thyself (dans toi)." 
The contradiction in the cartesian's theory, 
which would be harmless and without conse­
quence if it could be contained at that le­
vel, has nCM becane, in the cartesian's ac­
tion, a IlIOnstrous contradiction of his own 
humanity. Moreover, by asserting the dog's 
derronstration of friendship and love, a high 
level of social relationship that the anthro­
pocentric cartesian would reserve for human 
beings alone, Voltaire demolishes the carte­
sian's claim of IlIOral superiority and estab­
lishes the contrary, the animal's superiori­
ty, not in the mJde of an allegorical fable, 
but as literal fact, made apparent by this 
confrontation of the dog's loving behavior 
and the cartesian's insensitive brutality. 
There are in this brief article of Vol­
taire's sane further words on the question of 
the souls of animals. Are they substantial 
forms, as Aristotle and Christian theologians 
maintained? Or are their souls material? 
These pages may interest us less as a ccmnen­
tary on Voltaire's conception of our relation 
to animals and our obligations toward them. 
They are, however, revelatory of his impa­
tience with what he considered futile rreta­
physical questions and the kind. of vaporous 
mentality he associated with them. He also 
uses the question to reassert the attribution 
of feeling, nerory, and thought (limited, 
perhaps, to "a certain number of ideas") by 
the same supreme being who makes grass grow 
and subjected the earth to the sun's gravita­
tional force, thus reminding his readers of 
his preference for Newton above Aristotle and 
Descartes, as a true ideologist of the En­
lightenment. 
This part of VOltaire's article is also 
related in its thrust to other texts that he 
p..1t together on the subject of the soul, 
which he always took great pleasure in demys­
tifying. In one of them, which appeared a 
few years later (in Questions sur l' Encyclo­
~, 1770), he repeated elements of the 
article we have been discussing, but with the 
difference that Descartes is named and that 
what he calls "the strange system which sup­
poses animals to be p..1re machines without any 
sensation" is identified as Descartes' "chi­
mera. " (See "De l'Arne des Betes" ["en Ani­
rnals' Souls") in Dictionnaire philosophique, 
Notes, pp. 428-9.) As usual, ridicule and 
irony are his weapons as he IlIOCks Descartes' 
unprecedented "abuse of the gift of rea­
soning" with his curious assumption that 
nature gave animals all of our organs of 
feeling in order that they might be totally 
deprived of feeling! D:>ubtless, this was not 
quite the way Descartes had p..1t it, but the 
lurid clarity of Voltaire's way of spelling 
out the grotesque implication of the carte­
sian argument effectively causes it to dis­
solve in absurdity, as his reader dissolves 
in laughter, a technique that Voltaire raised 
to the level of high art in candide and many 
other pieces of philosophical fiction. 
*** 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau was as much a man 
of the Enlightenment as Voltaire, although 
that. can be obscured by the fact that they 
came to detest each other and by Rousseau's 
progressive isolation from the other main­
stream philosophes. When Rousseau writes of 
animals, it is in a very different voice from 
Voltaire's, but it is all the IlIOre striking 
that so much of their approach to the ques­
tion should be based on the same tmderlying 
concerns. Most important, perhaps, is that, 
like Voltaire, Rousseau attached great impor­
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tance to our fellow animals' capacity for 
feeling and through this to their kinship 
with us. 
Banal as it is to say, ooe cannot over­
state the importance Rousseau attached to 
sentiment. For him (as for other "pre-ranan­
tics" of the eighteenth century) the capacity 
for feeling deeply was a fatal gift, a guar­
anty of pain, but also of !lOral value. ('!bat 
gift, rather than learning or physical beau­
ty, was what attracted the heroine of Rous­
seau's novel, The New Heloise, to her young 
tutor. ) in the Emile, Rousseau's chronicle 
of a child's developnent into adulthood, he 
cooducts the boy into adolescence, the pas­
sion and !lOral awakening of which are asso­
ciated roore than anything else with the reve­
latioos of deep feeling. The child Emile 
had, of course, felt pleasure and pain, but, 
like other children, had remained indifferent 
to what was outside of himself. It is in the 
birth of pity, experienced through the cries 
and convulsions of a dying animal that the 
child bece::Kres a man. This is what Rousseau 
calls his first "relative" feeling: 
To beccrne sensitive and capable of 
pity, the child must know that 
there are beings like himself who 
suffer what he has suffered. 
In fact, how are we to allow our­
selves to be rooved by pity tmless 
it is by escaping fran ourselves 
and identifying ourselves with the 
suffering animal by taking leave, 
so to speak, of our own being in 
order to assume his? (Emile, Book 
IV, p. 261.) 
It is surely significant that Rousseau 
chose the spectacle of the death throes of an 
animal as the event to awaken in his young 
pupil a sense of kinship with others than 
himself so that the erootion of pity may be 
born. He recognized that not all human 
beings are rooved deeply by the suffering of 
animals and speculated on why it is that we 
can be roore hardened to their pain than to 
that of other human beings, despite the fact 
that the sensitivity that we share in cammon 
ought to identify us equally with them. One 
cause, he believed, is the supposition that 
animals are less endowed with either rnemJry 
(of past suffering) or imagination (of the 
future) than we are. And, thus, the animal's 
suffering is judged roore limited than the 
presumably roore canplex person's. 
Rousseau uses this distinctioo that 
people are accuste:.tred to draw between them­
selves and animals to develop an analogy with 
distinctions people make aroong themselves: 
"By extension we beccrne hardened in the same 
way toward the lot of sane men, and the rich 
console themselves for the harm they do to 
the poor by supposing that they are stupid 
enough not to feel it" (pp. 264-5). In this 
way, Rousseau alroost slyly insinuates an 
accusation of soc:ial injustice with the cas­
uistic justificatioo by the rich of their 
wrongdoing into his argument about animals, 
thus putting human apologetics for their 
mistreatment in the same perspective and also 
inviting redress for animals as a parallel to 
the struggle for human rights on the part of 
the impoverished mass of people. 
Rousseau's developnent of this analogy 
strikes at assumptions that have been made 
throughout history. Aristotle, for example, 
cast doubts upon the humanity of slaves. in 
the enlightened nineteenth century, it was 
cammonly assumed that working class men and 
wanen lacked the sensitivity of the roonied 
classes and suffered less fran hunger, cold, 
and other deprivations. Nietzsche, in a 
curious passage of his On the Genealogy of 
Morals, declared his solemn conviction that 
Blacks ("taken as representatives of prehis­
toric man") can endure pain "that would drive 
even the best constituted European to dis­
traction." In a truly extraordinary sen­
tence, even for Nietzsche, he elaborated on 
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this by no means uncamon idea that both 
animals and the lower orders of the hunan 
species are relatively insensitive to pain: 
'Ibe curve of hunan susceptibility 
to pain seems in fact to take an 
extraordinary and abrost sudden 
drop as soon as one has passed the 
upper ten thousand or ten million 
of the top stratum of culture; and 
for my own part, I have no doubt 
that the canbined suffering of all 
the animals ever subjected to the 
knife for scientific ends is utter­
ly negligible compared with one 
painful night of a single hysteri­
cal bluestocking. (On the Genealo­
gy of Morals, SecondEssay , Section 
VII. ) 
rbrds like these denonstrate the sadly ines­
capable fact that the brilliant Nietzsche, 
capable of truly radical thought, was as much 
a prey to ignorant superstition as the roost 
benighted of his contemp::rraries. We may, of 
course, agree that people whose bodies have 
been softened by inactivity and canfort may 
feel the sudden imposition of pain roore a­
cutely than those who have had to accustor. 
themselves to hardship. But Rousseau's per­
ception of the canbination of bad faith and 
prejudice in the rich person's lulling of his 
conscience and of the analogous way in which 
men make little of animals' suffering seems 
far roore penetrating than Nietzsche's wild 
thrashing, in which he takes on not only 
animals but also African Blacks, intellectual 
wanen, and all the impoverished masses unfor­
tunate enough to be born below the top "stra­
tum" of European society. 
'Ibe argument in Rousseau's Emile is 
readily relatable to passages in other wri­
tings of his in which, for reasons both per­
sonal and philosophical, he attacks the ine­
qualities that have developed in hunan socie­
ty. Probably the roost significant of these 
is the second discourse of 1754 on the ori­
gins of inequality annng men. In the preface 
to that work, attentive as always to the 
importance of the pre-rational, he had iden­
tified two "principles:" an ardent preoccu­
pation with our own well-being and self­
preservation and "a natural rep.lgnaIlce to see 
any sensitive being and principally those of 
our own kind (~ semblables) perish or suf­
fer" (Ganlier-Flanmarion edition, p. 153). 
An inner i..rnp.l1se of ccmni.seration (assimil­
able to the pity born in the fourth book of 
the Emile) will agitate on behalf of our 
never harming another man "or even any sensi­
tive being (aucun etre sensible)." 
For Rousseau, this settles the ancient 
disp..1tes on participation by animals in natu­
ral law: 
For it is clear that, deprived of 
intellect and of freedan, they 
cannot recognize [natural law]; 
but, since they share sarething of 
r;:nrr nature through the sensitivity 
with which- they are endowed, one 
will judge that they too ought to 
participate in natural right and 
that man is subject to sore sort of 
duties toward them. It seems, in 
fact, that, if I am obliged to do 
no harm to my fellow man [roon sem­
blable], it is less because he is a 
reasonable being than because he is 
a sensitive being; a quality that, 
being camon to beast and man, 
ought at least to give the one the 
right not to be uselessly mis­
treated by the other (Ibid.). 
We must, of course, recognize that, 
despite his heretical deviations fran both 
catholic and calvinist dogma of his time, 
Rousseau was less estranged fran theological 
conceptions than Voltaire and was, therefore, 
roore disposed to deny animals both reason and 
freedan. Nevertheless, there are at least 
two radical elements in this statement of 
his. One is that animals have rights. More­
over, the right Rousseau enunciates (not to 
be mistreated by men) is conceived on the 
roodel of eighteenth century hunan rights in 
the sense that it is a defensive right, a 
right that limits the freedan of the oppres­
sor to have his way with the victim. More 
than an "enabling~ right for the individual 
for whan the right is proclaimed, it is a 
"privative" curbing of previously uninhibited 
powers of authority. 'Ibe fact that Rousseau 
sees things this way is in itself a great 
leap forward, even though he is willing to 
limit the forbidden mistreatment to what is 
"useless." 
'Ibe second radical element of Rousseau's 
argument is his displacement of intelligence 
or rationality as a qualification for animal 
rights or hunan obligations toward them. 
Jeremy Bentham will write just a few decades 
later in words that sound like a crisp, con­
densed echo of Rousseau's: "The ~estion is 
Bm.WEEN 'mE SPEX::IES 8 
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not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk [as 
Descartes had held]? but, Can they suffer?" 
(Fran '!be Principles of M:lrals and Legisla­
tion, 1789, quoted by Regan and Singer, ~. 
cit., p. 130.) 
As a matter of fact, declarations of 
rights for human beings have not claimed them 
only for conspicuously rational members of 
the species. '!be 1\merican Declaration of 
Independence declared all rren equal and 
claimed rights for them all (even conceivably 
including by implication future liberation 
for wanen and slaves). One after the other, 
exploited and oppressed groups have asserted 
and struggled for rights, winning them to 
sane extent, no doubt, through the exercise 
of tactical intelligence, but without relying 
on a stipulation of intellect as a require­
rrent for a<XIUisition of the rights in ques­
tion. On the other hand, the denial of 
rights has frequently been justified (even 
very recently by amateur geneticists in the 
United States, for example) by a claim of 
intellectual inferiority. 
For Rousseau, this displacement is all 
the rrore significant because of his acknow­
ledgement of man's intellectual superiority. 
He believed that for animals instinct is the 
rrotive force behind choice and action--per­
haps, a bit as sane biologists today believe 
it is the encoded message on a genetic "tape" 
that has replaced the stars in arbitrating 
human destiny---whereas man decides (in alrrost 
Sartrean terms) through an act of freedan. 
As often, the distinctions are scrrewhat mur­
ky. Rousseau seens to follow Descartes when 
he sees in the animal "an ingenious machine;" 
but then he also speaks of the "human ma­
chine, " and the contrast is no longer abso­
lute. '!be animal lacks intellect (lumi.ere), 
but it is capable of conceiving "ideas," 
"because it has senses," and it is also capa­
ble of canbining ideas. Proof, if we did not 
have enough of it fran other sources, that 
Rousseau had read John Locke. But, here he 
is applying Locke's notions on human under­
standing to mindless animals 1 
One might see in these apparently con­
tradictory positions a sign of the awkward 
dilarma Rousseau and other philosoPlers con­
front when they have inherited rroral reserva­
tions about admitting their close kinship 
with animals and yet are prevented by their 
own honesty fran denying totally what obser­
vation has taught them. Rousseau seems to 
arrive at an amalgam of concepts in which he 
cannot refrain fran fo=lating differences 
that he has been led to believe IlU.lSt be 
essential but stops short of permitting the 
conception of those differences to legitimize 
inflicting pain on animals, and, on the other 
hand, he clings to a perception of our kin­
ship with animals as sensitive beings and to 
our CXJIl1lOfl right to have rights in self­
defense against oppression. 
The line of perceived kinship leads 
Rousseau to deferrling the practice of vege­
tarianism (Origins of Inequality, p. 163). 
He finds that the structure of human teeth 
and intestines puts us arrong the fruit-eaters 
(les frugivores). This, he suggests, is 
evidence that, in the state of nature fran 
which man has fallen, he lived (contrary to 
Hobbes' grinmer view) in peace with his fel­
low creatures. It is the flesh-eating ani­
mals that engage in canbat for their prey, 
whereas vegetarians co-exist in perpetual 
peace, as humankind might have if we had 
remllned fruit-eaters and never left the 
idyllic state of nature. Thus does Rousseau 
integrate the myth of a lost paradise where 
we were innocent and happy with a serious 
critique of the Plysical exploitation of 
animals. In abandoning the bloodless diet of 
fruits and vegetables, man symbolically for­
sook peaceful relations with his fellow crea­
tures on earth, cast the die for survival 
through killing, and thus added violence 
tcMard other animals to the other manifesta­
tions of rroral degredation that Rousseau 
associated with the historical evolution of 
human society. 
*** 
Although neither Rousseau nor Voltaire 
may have achieved in its totality that "deli­
berate recognition" of animals' rights that 
Henry Salt situated in the age of enlighten­
ment and sensibility, their part in preparing 
a climate favorable to it is at least as 
important as Salt believed it was. Both of 
them rejected the absolute conderrnation of 
animals to treatment as objects of insentient 
matter. Both, in their different styles, 
argued for our acceptance of animals as fel­
low creatures, capable of thought and, above 
all, of feeling. Both wrote in an era that 
voiced its horror of violence, of war, of 
persecution, and of ignorant superstition and 
intolerance. Like Kant, both would have 
continued on page 24 
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troying the happiness of others. Thus, R2 is  continued from page 9 
at odds with both of our primary IlX)ral con-
an end in itself, although when Kant, alas,
cerns, justice and happiness. Consequently, 
approved anneither premise of the pro-researcher argu- ethic forbidding utilization of a 
sentient creature as an object rather than asment is morally justified. 
declared that ''man can have no duty to any 
beings except hwnan," what we knCM of both 
Conclusion Voltaire and Rousseau suggests very strongly 
that at that point they would have parted 
<Xmpany with this all too hwnanistic philoso-
prohibit all research with animals, is un- ];i1er and, like Schopenhauer, have found that 
proposition "revolting and abaninable." 
The pro-aniJnal argument, which would 
sound, but so is the pro-researcher argument, 
which would pennit any experiment on animals 
which might benefit humms. The reasons 
against these arguments suggest the following 
positive conclusions: 
EDITIOOS Q)NSULTED 
(i ) Fundarnentally, there should be just 
one set of moral principles concerning re-
search, rather than one set for experiments Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of 
on hwnans and another, weaker set for experi- Morals (New York: Vintage Books, 1969). 
ments on non-humms. 
Tan Regan and Peter Singer, An.i.mal 
(ii) Experimental sacrifices must be Rights and Ht.nnan Obligations (Engl~ 
limited to situations in which there is a Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1976). 
clear and present opportunity for making the 
world a happier place and ImlSt be roade ac- Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile (1762) (Pa-
cording to principles which insure that the ris: Garnier, 1957).  
sacrifices are borne fairly by all those 
likely to benefit fran the experiment.  Discours sur 
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